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Andrzej WROŃSKI
ON PR U C N A L’S M ODEL-DETERM INED LOGIC 
AND DEFINABLE PREDICATES
A b s t r a c t .  P ru c n a l’s concep t of a  logic d eterm ined  by a  m odel is 
discussed. I t is proved th a t  logics different from  th e  pure  first-o rder 
one can be d eterm ined  by m odels w ith  undecidab le  theories.
Let L be a first-order language and let M  =  (M, I )  be a model for L. 
Then every formula ^>(xi, . . .  , x n ) of L determines a unique n-place predi­
cate:
ym ,n  =  { (a i , . . .  ) G m n : M  =  y [ a i , . . .  ,a „ ]}
Here, of course, the notation y (x 1, . . . ,  xn ) is used to  indicate th a t the free 
variables of y  constitute a subset of {x1, . . .  ,x n } (see [1] p. 24).
A n-placed relation R  C M n is said to  be definable in M  if there exists 
a formula y (x 1, . . . ,  xn ) in L such th a t R =  y M,n.
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Let Lo be the pure first-order language in the sense of Church [2] i.e. 
the language w ithout identity, individual constants and function symbols 
equipped with tt0 predicate symbols with n-places, for every n  >  0. Let 
L0 (M) be the class of all models for L 0 of the form (M, I 0) where the inter­
pretation function I 0 m aps predicate symbols of L 0 to predicates definable 
in M . It is easy to  see, th a t Th(L0 (M )) i.e. the theory in the language 
L0 determ ined by the class L 0 (M) coincides w ith the logic of the model 
M  in the sense of Prucnal [5]. We shall use the symbol LP(M) to denote 
P rucnal’s logic determ ined by M  in the above sense.
The fact th a t every theory of the form Th(L0(M )) m ust be closed 
under the rule of substitu tion for predicate symbols justifies in a way the 
term  logic in this case. Indeed, the property of being closed under the rule 
of substitu tion for predicate symbols is one of distinctive features of logic 
among various theories and consequently any law of the pure first-order 
predicate logic can be viewed as a law-schema describing a set of similar 
laws.
The reason why the pure first-order predicate logic is closed under the 
rule of substitu tion for predicate symbols is quite simple: a logical law m ust 
be true  under every in terpretation in every non-em pty universe. Thus, any 
law of the pure first-order logic can be made into a law of the second-order 
logic ju st by binding all predicate symbols w ith universal quantifiers i.e. 
for every sentence y  of the language L 0, if all predicate symbols of y  are 
among P 1, . . . ,  Pn then  we have:
O b s e rv a tio n  1. VP1 . . .  VPny  is a law o f the second-order logic iff  M  =  y, 
for every model M .
Despite its simplicity, the above observation yields an im portant con­
sequence: there is no hope to find a decidable set of axioms and rules of 
inference for second-order logic.
Often it happens th a t LP(M) coincides with the pure first-order logic. 
It was first noticed by Dr. M arcin Mostowski during the discussion following
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P rucnal’s lecture a t 39-th Conference on the History of Logic in Cracow, 
1993. Answering a question of Tadeusz Prucnal Dr. Mostowski recalled a 
classical result of Hilbert and Bernays [3], pp. 252-253, which easily yields:
F a c t 2. I f  y  is a satisfiable formula o f L 0 whose predicate symbols are 
among  P 1, . . . ,  P n then it is satisfied by a model o f the form: (w, R 1, . . . ,  R n ) 
where all predicates R i are definable in the standard m odel o f arithmetic.
Thus, by virtue of the metamathematical completeness theorem  of 
H ilbert and Bernays (see Kleene [4] p. 394), LP(M) equals to  the pure 
first-order logic whenever M  is an expansion of the standard  model of 
arithm etic.
Soon it became clear th a t such equality cannot occur if M  has a de- 
cidable first-order theory. Indeed, we have:
F a c t 3. Let be the class o f all models M  such tha t Th(M ) is decidable. 
Then the corresponding Prucnal’s logic, LP() =  f j  {LP(M ) : M  e}, exceeds 
the pure first-order logic (see [6, 7]).
To see th a t undecidability of Th(M ) not necessarily forces LP(M) to 
stay small we prove:
F a c t 4. For every infinite set X  C w there exists a mono-unary algebra
such tha t the degree o f unsolvability o f  T h (N X ) is at least as big as 
tha t o f  X  and LP(NX) exceeds the pure first-order logic.
P ro o f . Let f  : w ^  w be a bijection. By the order of an element 
m  e  w we shall mean cardinality of the subuniverse generated by m  in 
the algebra ( w ,f ). Since f  is a bijection, the order of any element of the 
subuniverse generated by m  m ust be the same as the order of m  itself and, 
moreover, for every natu ra l num ber n  >  0, the discourse language of the 
algebra (w, f ) contains a formula pn (x) meaning that: x is an object o f order 
n. If m, n  e  w and n  >  0 then the discourse language of (w, f ) contains 
also a sentence •fm,n meaning that: there exist exactly m  objects o f order
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n. By discourse language of an algebra we m ean of course the first-order 
language with identity, equipped with symbols of basic operations.
Now let X  ę  u  be an infinite set of na tu ra l numbers. W ithout loss of 
generality we can assume th a t 0 € X . Let f X : u  ^  u  be a bijection such 
th a t the following condition is satisfied:
• For every n  € u , n  >  0, the algebra N X =  (u, f X ) has exactly n  objects
of order n  if n  € X  and zero objects of order n  if n  € X .
It is easy to see th a t any decision procedure for T h(N X ) can be also 
used as a decision procedure for X  because n  € X  iff N X =  ^ n,n , for every 
n  >  0.
To prove th a t LP(NX ) exceeds the pure first order logic one can use 
a sentence y  involving two binary predicate symbols E  and P , where E  
plays the role of identity predicate and P  plays the role of a linear ordering 
w ithout the greatest element, whose domain is the whole universe. We will 
show th a t - y  € LP(NX ). Indeed, if - y  € LP(N X) then there exists a 
model M  =  (u ,I )  where the relations I (E ) ,I ( P ) are definable in N X and 
M  =  y. Since I ( E )  is an equivalence relation on u  then  picking a unique 
element in every equivalence class of I ( E ) we can build up a selector S  ę  u . 
Pu tting  now R  =  S 2 H I ( P ) we obtain a s tructu re  (S, R) which is an infinite 
chain. Since the relation I ( P ) is definable in N X then, by virtue of a well- 
known theorem  of Shelah (see [1] p. 505), the theory T h(N X) should be 
unstable. This, however, cannot be true  because T h(N X ) is categorical in 
every uncountable power. Thus supposing th a t - y  € LP(N X) one gets a 
contradiction.
The argum ent used in the above proof yields a result similar to  th a t 
of Fact 3, namely:
F a c t 5. L et be the class o f all models M  such tha t  Th(M ) is stable. Then  
the corresponding Prucnal’s logic, LP() =  f j  {LP(M) : M  €}, exceeds the  
pure first-order logic.
Thus we have to end with the following:
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P ro b le m . Characterize models M  such tha t LP(M) equals to the pure  
first-order logic.
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